This chapter offers an accessible introduction to the channel-based approach to Bayesian probability theory. This framework rests on algebraic and logical foundations, inspired by the methodologies of programming language semantics. It offers a uniform, structured and expressive language for describing Bayesian phenomena in terms of familiar programming concepts, like channel, predicate transformation and state transformation. The introduction also covers inference in Bayesian networks, which will be modelled by a suitable calculus of string diagrams.
Introduction
In traditional imperative programming one interprets a program as a function that changes states. Intuitively, the notion of 'state' captures the state of affairs in a computer, as given for instance by the contents of the relevant parts of the computer's memory. More abstractly, a program is interpreted as a state transformer. An alternative, logical perspective is to interpret a program as a predicate transformer. In that case the program turns one predicate into a new predicate. This works in opposite direction: the program turns a predicate on the 'post-state' into a predicate on the 'pre-state', for instance via the weakest precondition computation. As discovered in the early days of programming semantics, basic relations exists between state transformation and predicate transformation, see for instance [7, 8] (formulated in Proposition 9 below). A similar theory of state and predicate transformation has been developed for probabilistic programming, see [25, 26] . This approach has been generalised and re-formulated in recent years in categorical terms, typically using so-called Kleisli categories [15] and more generally via the notion of effectus [5] . Category theory provides a fundamental language for the semantics of programming languages. This is clear in approaches based on domain theory. For instance, many constructions for types in programming languages have categorical counterparts, like (co)products, exponentials, and initial algebras (and final coalgebras) -where these (co)algebras are used for fixed points. These categorical notions come with universal properties that guide the design (syntax) and rules of programming languages.
This use of category theory is well-established in functional programming languages. However, it is less established in probabilistic programming. The description of some of the basic notions of probability theory in categorical terms goes back to the early 1980s (see [11] ) and has seen a steady stream of activities since -see e.g. [20, 21, 40, 2, 37, 39, 22, 23, 30, 35, 28, 10, 6, 32, 36, 33] ). This perspective is not a goal in itself, but it does offer a structural, implementation-independent way of thinking which is natural for systematic programmers.
This paper offers an introduction to this principled perspective on probability theory, esp. for Bayesian probabilistic programming, based on earlier work of the authors' in this | c . The 'ket' notation | · is syntactic sugar: it has no mathematical meaning, but echoes how states are represented in quantum theory, where our theory may be also instantiated [18] . A 'predicate' on a set A is a function p : A → [0, 1]. It assigns a probability p(a) ∈ [0, 1] to each element a ∈ A. Such predicates are often called 'fuzzy'. When p(a) ∈ {0, 1}, so that either p(a) = 0 or p(a) = 1, for each a ∈ A the predicate is called sharp. A sharp predicate is traditionally called an event, and corresponds to a subset of A. Similarly to the case of states, our terminology draws an analogy with programming language semantics. There is a duality between states and predicates, which goes beyond the scope of this introduction -so the interested reader is referred to [15] . A 'channel' A → B from a set A to another set B is an A-indexed collection ω a a∈A of states ω a on the set B. Alternatively, it is a function a → ω a that sends each element a ∈ A to a distribution on B. For A and B finite, yet another equivalent description is as a stochastic matrix with |A| columns and |B| rows. Channels are the pivot of our theory: states, predicates, and -as we shall see in Section 6 -also Bayesian networks can be seen as particular cases of a channel. More specifically, a state ω on B can be seen as a channel f : { } → B with source the one-element set { }, defined by f ( ) = ω. A predicate p : A → [0, 1] can be seen as a channel A → {0, 1} that assigns to a ∈ A the state p(a)| 1 + (1 − p(a))|0 .
Spell out the state
Our first perspective elaborates on the observation that, in traditional probability, it is custom to leave the probability distribution implicit, for instance in describing the probability Pr(E) of an event E = {a, c} ⊆ A. This is justified because this distribution, say ω = |c , is typically fixed, so that carrying it around explicitly, as in Pr ω (E), burdens the notation. In contrast, in probabilistic programming, programs act on distributions (states) and change them with every step. Hence in our framework it makes sense to use a richer notation, where states/distributions have a more prominent role.
First, pursuing a more abstract, logical viewpoint, we introduce notation |= in place of Pr. For an arbitrary state ω on a set A and a predicate p : A → [0, 1] on the same set A, the validity ω |= p of p in ω is the number in [0, 1] given by:
When we identify an event (sharp predicate) E ⊆ A with its characteristic function 1 E : A → [0, 1], we have ω |= 1 E = Pr ω (E) = 1 2 . The enhanced notation allows to distinguish this from the probability of E wrt. an alternative state ψ = Once we start treating states as explicit entities, we can give proper attention to basic operations on states, like parallel composition ⊗, marginalisation, and convex combination. These operations will be elaborated below in Section 3.
Conditional probability is state update with a predicate
Traditionally, conditional probability is described as Pr(B | A), capturing the probability of event B given event A. This notation is unfortunate, certainly in combination with the notation Pr(B) for the probability of event B. It suggests that conditioning | is an operation on events, and that the probability Pr(·) of the resulting event B | A is computed. This perspective is sometimes called 'measure-free conditioning' [9] . The fact that states are left implicit, see the previous point 2.1, further contributes to the confusion.
In the view advocated here, conditioning is an operation that updates a state ω in the light of evidence in the form of a predicate p. This is well-defined when ω and p have the same underlying set A, and when the validity ω |= p is non-zero. We shall then write ω| p for the state "ω given p", see Section 4 for more details. We emphasise that the validity Pr(B | A) in state ω can now be expressed as ω| 1 A |= 1 B . It is the validity of B in the state where the evidence A is incorporated.
State/predicate transformation becomes explicit
The following notation Pr(X = a) often occurs in traditional probability theory. What does it mean, and what is assumed? On close reading we find that the following data are involved.
A set, often called sample space, Ω with a state/distribution ω on it; please note that ω is not an element of Ω but a probability distribution over elements of Ω;
A stochast, or random variable, X : Ω → A, for some set A of outcomes;
An element a ∈ A with associated event
The probability Pr(X = a) is then the validity of the latter event in the state ω, that is, it is ω |= 1 X −1 (a) .
A stochast is a special kind of channel (namely a deterministic one). The operation X −1 (a) will be described more systematically as 'predicate transformation' X 1 {a} along the channel X. It turns the (singleton, sharp) predicate 1 {a} on A into a predicate on Ω. In fact, X 1 {a} can be seen as just function composition Ω → A → [0, 1]. Since X 1 {a} is now a predicate on Ω, the probability Pr(X = a) can be described more explicitly as validity: ω |= X 1 {a} . More generally, for an event E on A we would then determine the probability Pr(X ∈ E) as ω |= X E.
One can use the channel X also for 'state transformation'. In this way one transforms the state ω on Ω into a state X ω on A. This operation is sometimes (aptly) called pushforward, and X ω is the pushforward distribution. The probability Pr(X = a) can equivalently be described as validity X ω |= 1 {a} .
In Section 5 we elaborate on channels. One of our findings will be that the probabilities ω |= c p and c ω |= p are always the same -for a channel c from A to B, a state ω on A, and a predicate p on B.
Moreover, we can profitably combine predicate transformation and state transformation with conditioning of states from point 2.2. As will be elaborated later on, we can distinguish the following two basic combinations of conditioning and transformation, with the associated terminology. 
Use channels as probabilistic functions
We have already mentioned the notation c : A → B to describe a channel c from A to B. Recall that such a channel produces a state c(a) on B for each element a ∈ A. It turns out that there is a special way to compose channels: for c : A → B and d : B → C we can form a composite channel d c : A → C, understood as "d after c". We can define it via state transformation as
It is not hard to check that is associative, and that there are identity maps id : A → A, given by id(a) = 1|a . They form unit elements for channel composition .
Abstractly, channels form morphisms in a 'category'. The concept of a category generalises the idea of sets and functions between them, to objects and morphisms between them. These morphisms in a category need not be actual functions, but they must be composable (and have units). Such morphisms can be used to capture different forms of computation, like non-deterministic, or probabilistic (via channels). Here we shall not use categorical machinery, but use the relevant properties in more concrete form. For instance, composition of channels interacts appropriately with state transformation and with predicate transformation, as in:
In addition to sequential composition we shall also use parallel composition ⊗ of channels, with an associated calculus for combinining and ⊗. The traditional approach in probability theory focuses on sharp predicates, in the form of events. This is part of the notation, for instance in expressions like Pr(X ∈ E), as used earlier in point 2.2. It does not make much sense to replace this sharp E with a fuzzy p when writing Pr(X ∈ E). That is one more reason why we write validity via |= and not via Pr. Fuzzy predicates have actually surfaced in more recent research in Bayesian probability, see e.g. the concepts of 'soft' evidence [38] and 'uncertain' evidence [29] , see also [1] . Fuzzy predicates have a different algebraic structure than sharp predicates. The latter form Boolean algebras. Fuzzy predicates however form effect modules (see e.g. [13] ). However, these algebraic/logical structures will not play a role in the current setting.
Predicates are generally fuzzy
We shall later sketch how a fuzzy predicate can be replaced by an additional node in a Bayesian network, see Remark 2.
Marginalisation and weakening are operations
Marginalisation is the operation of turning a joint distribution ω on a product domain X ×Y into a distribution on one of the components, say on X. Traditionally marginalisation is indicated by omitting one of the variables: if ω(x, y) is written for the joint distribution on X × Y , then ω(x) is its (first) marginal, as a distribution on X. It is defined as ω(x) = y ω(x, y). We prefer to write marginalisation as an explicit operation, so that M 1 (ω) is the first marginal (on X), and M 2 (ω) is the second marginal (on Y ). More generally, marginalisation can be performed on a state σ on a domain (6) below. In what we call crossover inference later on, the combination of marginalisation and weakening plays a crucial role.
Distinguish states and predicates
As just argued, marginalisation is an operation on states, whereas weakening acts on predicates (evidence). In general, certain operations only make sense on states (like convex sum) and others on predicates. This reflects the fact that states and predicates form very different algebraic structures: states on a given domain form a convex set (see e.g. [13] ), whereas, as already mentioned in Section 2.5, predicates on a given domain form an effect module.
Despite the important conceptual differences, states and predicates are easily confused, also in the literature (see e.g. Example 11 below). The general rule of thumb is that states involve finitely many probabilities that add up to one -unlike for predicates. We elaborate formally on this distinction in Remark 1 below.
On a more conceptual level, one could spell out the difference by saying that states have an ontological flavour, whereas predicates play an epistemological role. That means, states describe factual reality, although in probabilistic form, via convex combinations of combined facts. In contrast, predicates capture just the likelihoods of individual facts as perceived by an agent. Thus probabilities in predicates do not need to add up to one, because our perception of reality (contrary to reality itself) is possibly inconsistent or incomplete. 1 We shall elaborate more on this perspective at the end of Example 11 below.
3
States and predicates Subsection 2.1 claimed that states (finite probability distributions) and fuzzy predicatesand their different roles -should be given more prominence in probability theory. We now elaborate this point in greater detail. We thus retell the same story as in the beginning, but this time with more mathematical details, and with more examples.
States
A state (probability distribution) over a 'sample' set A is a formal weighted combination . . , a n }. Then supp(ω) = {a 1 , . . . , a n }, by construction.
For two states σ 1 ∈ D(A 1 ) and σ 2 ∈ D(A 2 ), we can form the joint 'product' state
on the cartesian product A 1 × A 2 of the underlying sets, namely as:
For instance, if
, then their product is written with ket-notation as:
Marginalisation works in the opposite direction: it moves a 'joint' state on a product set to one of the components: for a state ω ∈ D(A 1 × A 2 ) we have first and second marginalisation
Here we use explicit operations M 1 and M 2 for taking the first and second marginal. The traditional way to write a marginal is to drop a variable: a joint distribution is written as Pr(x, y), and its marginals as Pr(x) and Pr(y), where Pr(x) = y P (x, y) and Pr(y) =
The two original states σ 1 and σ 2 in a product state σ 1 ⊗σ 2 can be recovered as marginals of this product state:
In general a joint state ω ∈ D(A 1 × A 2 ) does not equal the product M 1 (ω) ⊗ M 2 (ω) of its marginals, making the whole more than the sum of its parts. When we do have ω = M 1 (ω) ⊗ M 2 (ω), we call ω non-entwined. Otherwise it is called entwined. For instance, the following joint state is entwined:
The original state ω differs from the product of its marginals: A for the sharp predicate associated with the event E ⊆ A, defined by 1 E (a) = 1 if a ∈ E and 1 E (a) = 0 if a ∈ E. Thus predicates are a more general, 'fuzzy' notion of event, which we prefer to work with for the reasons explained in Subsection 2.5. We write 1 = 1 A , 0 = 1 ∅ for the truth and falsity predicates. They are the top and bottom elements in the set of predicates [0, 1] A , with pointwise order. As special case, for an element a ∈ A we write 1 {a} for the 'singleton' or 'point' predicate on A that is 1 only on input a ∈ A.
For predicates p, q
Definition 2. Let ω ∈ D(A) be a state and p ∈ [0, 1]
A be a predicate, both on the same set A. We write ω |= p for the validity or expected value of p in state ω. This validity is a number in the unit interval [0, 1]. We recall its definition from (1):
For an event (sharp predicate) E, the probability Pr(E) wrt. a state ω is defined as a∈E ω(a). Using the above validity notation (4) we write ω |= 1 E instead. As special case we have ω |= 1 {x} = ω(x).
Notice that the validity ω |= 1 of the truth predicate 1 is 1 in any state ω. Similarly,
. There is also a parallel product ⊗ of predicates, like for states. Given two predicates
. It is not hard to see that:
A product p ⊗ 1 or 1 ⊗ p with the truth predicate 1 corresponds to weakening, that is to moving a predicate p to a bigger set (or context). We also write:
for these first and second weakening operations, like in Subsection 2.6. We deliberately use 'dual' notation for marginalisation M and weakening M because these operations are closely related, as expressed by the following equations.
As a result, 
Conditioning
Conditioning is one of the most fundamental operations in probability theory. It is the operation that updates a state in the light of certain evidence. This evidence is thus incorporated in a new, updated state, that reflects the new insight. For this reason conditioning is sometime called belief update or belief revision. It forms the basis of learning, training and inference, see also Section 6. A conditional probability is usually written as Pr(E | D). It describes the probability of event E, given event D. In the current context we follow a more general path, using fuzzy predicates instead of events. Also, we explicitly carry the state around. From this perspective, the update of a state ω with a predicate p, leading to an updated state ω| p , is the fundamental operation. It allows us to retrieve probabilities Pr(E | D) as special case, as will be shown at the end of this section. A be a predicate, both on the same set A. If the validity ω |= p is non-zero, we write ω| p or for the conditional state "ω given p", defined as formal convex sum:
Example 4. Let's take the numbers of a dice as sample space: pips = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, with a fair/uniform dice distribution dice ∈ D(pips).
We consider the predicate evenish ∈ [0, 1] pips expressing that we are fairly certain of pips being even:
evenish(3) = We first compute the validity of evenish for our fair dice: If we take evenish as evidence, we can update our state and get:
1 /2 |6 = As expected, the probability of the even pips is now higher than the odd ones.
We collect some basic properties of conditioning.
Lemma 5. Let ω ∈ D(A) and p, q ∈ [0, 1]
A be a state with predicates on the same set A. 
Conditioning with truth does nothing
Proof All these properties follow via straightforward computation. We shall do (2) and (?).
For (2) we use:
Similarly, for (?) we use:
The following result gives the generalisation of Bayes' rule to the current setting with states and predicates.
Theorem 6. Let ω ∈ D(A) and p, q ∈ [0, 1]
A be a state and two predicates on the set A.
The product rule holds:
2. Bayes' rule holds:
Proof Point (2) follows directly from (1) by using that p & q = q & p, so we concentrate on (1).
We now relate our state-and-predicate based approach to conditioning to the traditional one. Recall that for events E, D ⊆ A one has, by definition:
If these probabilities Pr(·) are computed wrt. a distribution ω ∈ D(A), we can continue as follows.
Thus the probability Pr(E | D) can be expressed in our framework as the validity of the sharp predicate E in the state updated with the sharp predicate D. This is precisely the intended meaning. 
2. Predicate transformation gives a predicate c q on A defined by:
The next example illustrates how state and predicate transformation can be used systematically to reason about probabilistic questions.
Example 8.
In a medical context we distinguish patients with low (L), medium (M), and high (H) blood pressure. We thus use as 'blood' sample space B = {L, M, H}, say with initial ('prior' or 'base rate') distribution β ∈ D(B):
We consider a particular disease, whose a priori occurrence in the population depends on the blood pressure, as given by the following 
We ask ourselves two basic questions.
1.
What is the a priori probability of the disease? The answer to this question is obtained by state transformation, namely by transforming the blood pressure distribution β on B to a disease distribution s β on D along the sickness channel s. Concretely: Thus we obtain as a priori disease distribution c β =
A bit more than 11% of the population has the disease at hand.
2.
What is the likely blood pressure for people without the disease? Before we calculate the updated ('a posteriori') blood pressure distribution, we reason intuitively. Since non-occurrence of the disease is most likely for people with low blood pressure, we expect that the updated blood pressure -after taking the evidence 'absence of disease' into account -will have a higher probability of low blood pressure than the orignal (a priori) value of B is computed as follows.
Notice that although 1 {d ⊥ } is a sharp predicate, the transformed predicate s 1 {d ⊥ } is not sharp. This shows that sharp predicates are not closed under predicate transformation -as mentioned earlier in Subsection 2.5.
We can now update the original blood pressure distribution β with the transformed evicence s 1 {d ⊥ } . We first compute validity, and then perform conditioning: 
As intuitively expected, a posteriori the probability of low blood pressure is higher than in the a priori distribution β -and the probability of high blood pressure is lower too.
These calculations with probabilities are relatively easy but may grow out of hand quickly. Therefore a library has been developed, called EfProb see [4] , that provides the relevant functions, for validity, state update, state and predicate transformation, etc.
It is natural to see a state β and a channel s, as used above, as stochastic matrices M β and M s , of the form: The diligent reader may have noticed in this example that the probability (s
80 in Example 8 coincides with the probability β |= (s
80 . This in fact in an instance of the following general result, relating validity and transformations.
Proposition 9. Let c : A → B be a channel, ω ∈ D(A) be a state on its domain, and q ∈ [0, 1]
B a predicate on its codomain. Then:
Proof The result follows from a simple calculation:
There are two more operations on channels that we need to consider, namely sequential composition and parallel composition ⊗.
Definition 10. Consider channels f : A → B, g : C → D and h : X → Y . These channels can be composed sequentially and in parallel, yielding new channels:
via the following definitions.
The latter formula shows that channel composition is essentially matrix multiplication. Next,
The product ⊗ on the right of := is the product of states, as described in (2) . In terms of matrices, parallel composition of channels is given by the Kronecker product.
It is not hard to see that and ⊗ are well-behaved operations, satisfying for instance:
They interact nicely with state and predicate transformation:
Moreover, for the identity channel id given by id(x) = 1| x we have:
We will see examples of parallel composition of channels in Section 7 when we discuss (the semantics of) Bayesian networks. There are some further special cases of deterministic channels that we mention explicitly. 
For two sets
As a result, equation (6) is a special case of (12) . Moreover, these projection channels commute with parallel composition ⊗ of channels, in the sense that:
For each set A there is a diagonal (or 'copy') function ∆ : A → A × A with ∆(a) = (a, a).

It can be turned into a channel too, as ‹∆› : A → A × A. However, this copy channel does not interact well with parallel composition of channels, in the sense that in general:
‹∆› f = f ⊗ f ‹∆›.
This equation does hold when the channel f is deterministic. Via diagonals we can relate parallel products ⊗ and conjunctions & of predicates:
In the sequel we often omit the braces ‹·› around projections and diagonals, and simply write projection and copy channels as π i :
Inference in Bayesian networks
In this section we illustrate how channels can be used both to model Bayesian networks and to reason about them. We shall use a standard example from the literature, namely the 'student' network from [24] . The graph of the student network is described in original form in Figure 1 . We see how a student's grade depends on the difficulty of a test and the student's intelligence. The SAT score only depends on intelligence; whether or not the student gets a strong (l 1 ) or weak (l 0 ) recommendation letter depends on the grade. With each of the five nodes in the network a sample space is associated, namely:
Figure 1
Picture of the student Bayesian network, copied from [24] , with conditional probability tables.
For the two inital nodes Difficulty (D) and Intelligence (I) we obtain two distributions/states ω D and ω I , whose probabilities are given in the two upper tables in Figure 1 :
They capture the a priori state of affairs, with a 0.4 likelihood of a difficult test (d 1 ), and a 0.3 likelihood of an intelligent student (i 1 ). The remaining three nodes Grade (G), Letter (L) and SAT (S) have incoming arrows from parent nodes, and are thus not initial. They correspond to three channels:
The definitions of these channels can be read directly from the tables. The SAT channel c S : I → S and the Letter channel c L : G → L are thus of the form:
The Grade channel c G : D × I → G looks as follows.
in Figure 1 . This is actually a subtle issue, because usually in graphs there is no order on the parents of a node, that is, the parents form a set and not a list.) We now discuss a number of inference questions from [24] and illustrate how they are answered systematically using our perspective with states, predicates and channels.
1.
What are the a priori probabilities for the recommendation? To answer this question we follow the graph in Figure 1 and see that the answer is given by twice using state transformation, namely:
What if we know that the student is not intelligent?
The non-intelligence translates into the point predicate 1 {i 0 } on the set I, which we use to update the intelligence state ω I before doing the same state transformations:
What if we additionally know that the test is easy?
The easiness evidence translates into the predicate 1 {d 0 } on D, which is used for updating the difficulty state:
The previous two outcomes are obtained by what is called 'causal reasoning' or 'prediction' or 'forward inference', see the table at the end of Subsection 2.3. We continue with 'backward inference', also called 'evidential reasoning' or 'explanation'.
What is the intelligence given a C-grade (g 3 )?
The evidence predicate 1 {g 3 } is a predicate on the set G. We like to learn about the revised intelligence. This is done as follows. Via predicate transformation we obtain a predicate c G 1 {g 3 } on D × I. We can use it to update the product state ω D ⊗ ω I . We then get the update intelligence by taking the second marginal, as in:
We see that the new intelligence (i 1 ) is significantly lower than the a priori value of 0.3, once a low grade is observed. The updated difficulty (d 1 ) probability is higher than the original 0.4; it is obtained by taking the first marginal:
What is the intelligence given a weak recommendation?
We now have a point predicate 1 {l 0 } on the set L. Hence we have to do predicate transformation twice, along the channels c L and c G , in order to reach the initial states. This is done as:
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6. What is the intelligence given a C-grade but a high SAT score? We now have two forms of evidence, namely the point predicate 1 {g 3 } on G for the C-grade, and the point predicate 1 {s 1 } on S for the high SAT score. We can transform the latter to a predicate c S 1 {s 1 } on the set I and update the state ω I with it. Then we can procede as in question 4:
Thus the probability of high intelligence is 57.8% under these circumstances. Using calculation rule that we have seen before, see notably in Lemma 5, this intelligence distribution can also be computed by weakening the predicate c S 1
Then we can take the conjunction with c G 1 {g 3 } and perform a single update, as in:
But one can also do the update with c S 1 {s 1 } at the very end, after the marginalisation, as in:
The associated difficulty level is the first marginal:
The answers to the above questions hopefully convey the systematic thinking that is behind the use of channels -in forward or backward manner, following the network structurein order to capture the essence of Bayesian networks. This systematics is elaborated further in subsequent sections. In the above 'student' example we have obtained the same outcomes as in traditional approaches. We conclude with an illustration where things differ.
Example 11. The power of the channel-based approach is that it provides a 'logic' for Bayesian inference, giving high-level expressions c ω| p and ω| c q for forward and backward inference. We include an illustration from [1] where our method produces a different outcome. The logical description may help to clarify the differences.
Consider the following Bayesian network. 
1.
What is the probability of a burglary given that the alarm sounds? In this case we have evidence 1 {a} on the set A, we pull it back to B × E along the channel c A , and we update the joint state ω B ⊗ ω E and take the first marginal:
2.
What is this probability if we additionally hear a warning on the radio? In that case we have additional evidence 1 {r} on R, which is pulled back along the channel c R and used to update the state ω E . Then:
3. . . . "imagine that we are only 70% sure we heard the burglar alarm sounding" In this situation we have a fuzzy predicate q : A → [0, 1] with q(a) = 0.7 and q(a ⊥ ) = 0.3. We perform the same computation as in question 1, but now with evidence q instead of 1 {a} . This yields:
However, in [1] a completely different computation is performed. The assumption about the alarm is not interpreted as a predicate, but as a state σ = 0.7|a + 0.3| a ⊥ , even though the whole example is presented as an illustration of the use of soft evidence. A different predicate p : A → [0, 1] is constructed, namely:
Thus, p(x) is the probability of a burglary if the alarm is x (that is, "sounding" if x = a and "silent" if x = a ⊥ ). The answer to the question "What is the probability of a burglary under this soft-evidence?" in [1] is computed as:
For questions 1 and 2 our calculations coincide with the ones in [1] , but for question 3 the answers clearly differ. We briefly analyse the situation. The description of soft evidence in [1] says 2 : "In soft or uncertain evidence, the evidence variable is in more than one state, with the strength of our belief about each state being given by probabilities." In subsequent illustrations these probabilities add up to 1. This strongly suggests that soft evidence in [1] is not evidence in the form of a predicate, but is a distribution (state). Indeed, the computation (16) uses the given soft evidence as a state σ. Here we see a clear case of mixing up states and predicates, c.f. Subsection 2.7. In contrast, in the current setting a fuzzy predicate is a [0, 1]-valued function, without any requirement that probabilities add up to 1. Hence in the setting of the above example we could have a fuzzy predicate saying: we are 70% sure we heard the alarm and 20% sure that we heard no alarm. This would translate into q(a) = 0.7 and q(a ⊥ ) = 0.2. In that case we would still be able to do the computation (14) , but the approach of [1] would fail.
Apart from the state/predicate confusion, the difference in computation can be formulated as: at which stage of the computation does one need to weigh the softness of the evidence? At the very end, as in (16) following [1] , or right at the beginning, as in (14) . The (soft) evidence about the alarm is translated in (15) , via the predicate p, into (soft) evidence about the burglary, which is then weighed in (16) using the weights 0.7 and 0.3 that were originally given about the alarm (and not about the burglary).
We claim that the weighing should be done in the beginning, on the alarm data for which the original evidence was given. In this way the channel c A : B × E → A takes the different alarm evidence probabilities into account, and translates them, via predicate transformation, into (soft) evidence on burglary and earthquake. More precisely, recall that we formalise the original soft evidence q on A as q(a) = 0.7, q(a ⊥ ) = 0. 
Similarly one computes:
The last equation expresses: the alarm evidence q gives me evidence that there was not a burglary and also not an earthquake with 30% certainty. There are similar interpretations of the other three cases in B × E. With this transformed evidence c A q on B × E we can update the product joint state ω B ⊗ω E on B ×E. It yields the state (ω B ⊗ω E )| c A q , whose first marginal yields the required burglary probability, as computed in (14) . Yet another perspective is that the above computation and the one in [1] are based on different ways of understanding what soft evidence actually means. In [1] this notion, even though it is not made mathematically precise, appears to have an ontological interpretation: "the alarm was heard" is a new fact, which has 70% chances of being true, and is therefor used as a state (distribution). On the other hand, our fuzzy predicate interpretation has an epistemological flavour: it is new information about a (possibly inconsistent) agent's belief that is made available. For instance, it can take the form of the testimony of a confused (or drunken) witness, saying: yes, I'm absolutely sure I heard the alarm; and also, when asked next, the witness could say: I'm certain I heard no alarm. We would then have soft evidence p with p(a) = p(a ⊥ ) = 1, and thus a fuzzy predicate rather than a probability distribution.
We shall briefly return to these different was of computation in Example 14 where we show that the outcome in (14) also appears via 'crossover inference'.
7
String diagrams for Bayesian probability
Abstractly, channels are arrows of a category, which is symmetric monoidal: it has sequential and parallel ⊗ composition. This categorical structure enables the use of a graphical (yet completely formal) notation for channels in terms of string diagrams [34] . We have no intention of giving a complete account of the string diagrammatic calculus here, and refer instead to [10] and [18, Remark 3.1] for details. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile pointing similarities and differences between the graphical representation of channels as string diagrams and the usual Bayesian network notation. We shall also use string diagrams to give a pictorial account of the important notion of disintegration (in the next section).
Informally speaking, string diagrams for channels are similar to the kind of graphs that is used for Bayesian networks, see Figure 1 , but there are important differences.
1.
Whereas flow in Bayesian networks is top-down, we will adopt the convention that in string diagrams the flow is bottom-up. This is an non-essential, but useful difference, because it makes immediately clear in the current context whether we are dealing with a Bayesian network or with a string diagram. Also, it makes our presentation uniform with previous work, see e.g. [3] . 2. The category where channels are arrows has extra structure, which allows for the use of "special" string diagrams representing certain elementary operations. We will have explicit string diagrams for copying and discarding variables, namely: copy = and discard = There are some 'obvious' equations between diagrams involving such copy and discard, such as:
These equations represent the fact that copy is the multiplication and discard is the unit of a commutative monoid. 3. With string diagrams one can clearly express joint states, on product domains like X 1 × X 2 , or X 1 × · · · × X n . This is done by using multiple outgoing pins, coming out of a triangle shape -used for states -as for ω ∈ D(
With this notation in place we can graphically express the marginals via discarding of wires:
4. Channels are causal or unitary in the sense that discarding their output is the same as discarding their input:
The Intelligence node in Figure 1 has two outgoing arrows, but this does not mean that Intelligence is a joint state. Instead, these two arrows indicate that the outgoing wire should be copied, with one copy going to the Grade node and one to the SAT node. In string diagram notation this copying is written explicitly as in the string-diagrammatic analogue of the student network in Figure 2 .
Recall that we wrote ω D = 0.6| d 0 + 0.4| d 1 and ω I = 0.7| i 0 + 0.3|i 1 for the initial states of the student network. The product state is non-entwined, since it equals the product of its marginals ω D and ω I . A basic fact in probability is that conditioning can create entwinedness, see e.g. [19] for more information. We can see this concretely when the above product state ω D ⊗ ω I is conditioned as in the fourth question in the previous section:
With some effort one can show that this state is not the product of its marginals: it is entwined. In the language of string diagrams we can express this difference by writing:
From joint states to Bayesian networks
Our framework allows to express states/distributions and Bayesian networks as entities of the same kind, namely as channels. It is natural to ask how the process of forming a Bayesian network from a distribution can be integrated in the picture. In traditional probability theory, this procedure forms one of the original motivations for developing the notion of Bayesian network in the first place. Such networks allow for more efficient representation of probabilistic information (via probability tables, as in Figure 1 ) than joint states, which quickly become unmanageable via an exponential explosion. We quote [24] : ". . . the explicit representation of the joint distribution is unmanageable from every perspective. Computationally, it is very expensive to manipulate and generally too large to store in memory" and [31] : ". . . a Bayesian network can often be far more compact than the full joint distribution".
The procedure of forming a Bayesian network from a given state usually goes through a sub-routine called disintegration. 
The state ω is determined as the first marginal ω = M 1 (σ) of σ. This can be seen by discarding the second wire -on the left and on the right in the above equation -and using that channels are causal, and that discarding one wire of a copy is the identity wire.
Disintegration is the process in the other direction, from a joint state to a channel.
Definition 12.
Let σ ∈ D(X × Y ) be a joint state. A disintegration of σ is a channel c : X → Y for which the equation (17) holds, where ω = M 1 (σ).
There is a standard formula for disintegration of a state σ ∈ D(X × Y ), namely:
We shall say that the channel c is 'extracted' from σ, or also that σ 'factorises' via c as in (17) . Intuitively, channel c captures the conditional probabilities expressed in traditional notation as Pr σ (y | x) via a distribution on Y indexed by elements x ∈ X. Definition 12 gives the basic form of disintegration. There are several variations, which are explored in [3] as part of a more abstract account of this notion. For instance, by swapping the domains one can also extract a channel Y → X, in the other direction. Also, if σ is a joint state on n domains, there are in principle 2 n ways of extracting a channel, depending on which pins are marginalised out, and which (other) ones are reconstructed via the channel. 
where ω 3 = M 3 (ω) = Pr ω (z) is the third marginal. These channels c 1 , c 2 may also be obtained by disintegration from the state M 1,2 (ω) = Pr ω (x, y) obtained by marginalising out the third variable. In more traditional notation, one can intuitively read (19) as saying that Pr ω (x, y, z) = Pr ω (x | z) · Pr ω (y | z) · Pr ω (z). We refer to [3] for the adequacy of this definition of conditional independence and its properties.
Another interesting observation is that disintegration forms a modular procedure. The formula (17) shows that disintegration yields a new decomposition of a given state: such a decomposition being a state itself, disintegration may be applied again. In fact, this repeated application is how a joint state on multiple domains gets represented as a Bayesian network. The channel-based approach understands this process uniformly as a step-by-step transformation of a given channel (a state) into another, equivalent channel (a Bayesian network). Once again, string diagrams are a useful formalism for visualising such correspondence. For instance, the joint state associated with the Student network from Figures 1  and 2 can be expressed as in Figure 3 . Notice that the diagram in Figure 3 is just the one in Figure 2 where each non-final node has been made externally accessible via additional copiers . Figure 3 has Thus the Bayesian inference theorem states the equivalence of crossover inference and transformer inference. Whereas crossover inference works well with small samples (see the examples below), it does not scale to larger networks, where transformations inference is preferable. The equivalence is widely known at some implicit level, but its formulation in this explicit form only arises within the current channel-based perspective on Bayesian networks.
We now provide a proof of the theorem. A purely diagrammatic argument is given in [3] .
